ARE THESE MISSILES ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS?

CIA UNABLE TO ANSWER JFK'S URGENT QUESTION

Washington, D.C. (JFK+50) Fifty-five years ago in late October 1962, at the same time John F. Kennedy was considering a course of action in the missile crisis, the CIA could not tell the President whether or not Soviet missiles in Cuba were armed with nuclear warheads.  This is important because the President's military advisers were recommending an armed invasion of the island by American forces.

Michael Dobbs writes...

"A week after the discovery of the Soviet missiles, CIA analysts were still unable to answer the president's most urgent question: where are the nuclear warheads?

The Soviet nuclear arsenal...far exceeded the worst nightmares of anyone in Washington.  It included....(not only) the ballistic missiles...but (also) an array of smaller weapons that could wipe out an invading army..."

Mr. Dobbs also lists the nuclear warheads that were in Cuba...

36 one megaton for medium range R-12 missiles

36 fourteen kilaton for cruise missiles

12 two kilaton for Lunas

6 twelve kilaton for IL28s

*note: 1 megaton - 1 million tons of TNT, 1 kilaton - 1000 tons of TNT

            the a-bomb dropped on Hiroshima = 15 kilatons

SOURCE

 "One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War," by Michael Dobbs, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008.

Soviet R-12 Nuclear Missile

Red Square, Moscow, USSR

CIA Photo

GENTLEMEN, TODAY WE'RE GOING TO EARN OUR PAY!

JFK+50:  Volume 7, No. 2475

JFK & ADVISERS DISCUSS OPTIONS ON 5TH DAY OF MISSILE CRISIS

Washington, D.C. (JFK+50) Fifty-five years ago today, October 20, 1962,  Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara* reported to President John F. Kennedy that CIA analysts estimated the Soviet Union had deployed "six thousand to eight thousand" troops to Cuba.

According to more recent research by Michael Dobbs, however, there were actually more than 40,000 Soviet troops in Cuba by the fifth day of the crisis. Dobbs says that the inaccuracy was because of rough estimates based on the number of Russian ships arriving in Cuba.

During the afternoon the President, who was scheduled to be campaigning in the Midwest, was called back to Washington by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.  RFK told JFK that he was needed to break a deadlock among his advisers.  The deadlock was on a choice between an air strike on Cuba or a naval blockade.

The air strike was proposed by National Security assistant to the President, McGeorge Bundy and was supported by John McCone, CIA director and Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Treasury.

The blockade proposal was advocated by McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Adlai Stevenson, UN Secretary and JFK speechwriter Ted Sorensen.

When JFK entered the Oval Sitting Room on the 2nd floor of the mansion where his advisers had gathered, the President said....

"Gentlemen, today we're going to earn our pay. You should all hope that your plan isn't the one that will be accepted."

SOURCE

"One Minute To Midnight:  Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War", by Michael Dobbs, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008.

*Robert S. "Bob" McNamara (1916-2009) was born in San Francisco, California & graduated from UC Berkeley in 1937 & Harvard Business School in 1939.  He served in the US Army in WWII & became president of Ford Motor Company in 1960.  He served as Defense Secretary from 1961 to 1968.

JFK & McNamara

The White House

June 19, 1961

Photo by Cecil Stougton

NARA/JFK Library Image

ARE THESE MISSILES ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS?

JFK+50:  Volume 6, No. 2107

CIA COULDN'T ANSWER JFK'S QUESTION ON MISSILES IN CUBA

In October 1962, at the same time JFK was considering a course of action in the Missile Crisis, the Central Intelligence Agency could not tell him for certain if the Soviet missiles in Cuba were armed with nuclear warheads.  This is important because the President's military advisers were favoring an armed invasion of Cuba by American forces.

Michael Dobbs writes:

"A week after the discovery of the Soviet missiles, CIA analysts were still unable to answer the president's most urgent question: where are the nuclear warheads?"

Dobbs continues....

"The Soviet nuclear arsenal...far exceeded the worst nightmares of anyone in Washington.    It included....(not only) the ballistic missiles...but (also) an array of smaller weapons that could wipe out an invading army..."

Mr. Dobbs also lists the nuclear warheads that were in Cuba as follows...

36 one megaton for medium range R-12 missiles

36 fourteen kilaton for cruise missiles

12 two kilaton for Lunas

6 twelve kilaton for IL28s

*note: 1 megaton - 1 million tons of TNT, 1 kilaton - 1000 tons of TNT

            the a-bomb dropped on Hiroshima = 15 kilatons

SOURCE

 "One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War," by Michael Dobbs, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008.

Soviet R-12 Nuclear Missile

Red Square, Moscow, USSR

CIA Photo

50TH ANNIVERSARY OF START OF CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

50TH ANNIVERSARY OF START OF CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Washington, D.C. (JFK+50) On Tuesday, October 16, 1962 at 11:50 A.M. in the words of Michael Dobbs from his book "One Minute To Midnight"*:

"The CIA's chief photo interpreter hovered over the president's shoulder. Arthur Lundahl held a pointer in his hand, ready to reveal a secret that would bring the world to the edge of nuclear war."

Before showing the pictures to JFK, Landahl labeled them with captions which read: "ERECTOR LAUNCHER EQUIPMENT," "MISSILE TRAILERS" & "TENT AREAS."

*One Minute To Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev & Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War, by Michael Dobbs, published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008.

Once he understood that the pictures showed Soviet missile sites in Cuba, the President asked this question:

"Are these missiles ready to be fired?"

The answer that came back was "we don't know."

If the missiles were armed with nuclear warheads, however, they could be fired in a matter of hours.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara counseled that these missiles were not ready to be fired, but chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, countered that the Soviets nonetheless would be able to fire them "very quickly."

Actually, JFK was informed of the missiles 3 hours earlier when his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, came to his bedroom in the White House to break the news.

In order to help keep the story hidden from the press, JFK decided to follow his  regular schedule, but, in the meantime, he contemplated the possibilities of ordering a launch strike to take out the missiles & an armed invasion of Cuba.**

**According to JFK's Agenda for Oct. 16, 1962, he met with LBJ, Dean Rusk, Maxwell Taylor, Roswell Gilpatrick & Edwin Martin from 11:50 a.m. until 12:57 p.m. in an OFF THE RECORD discussion on Cuba.

MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

In THE KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Sunday, October 14, 2012, an article titled "Cuban missile crisis misconceptions endure" by Peter Orsi of Associated Press appeared.

There are 3 misconceptions which Mr. Orsi identifies*:

1. The crisis was a triumph of U.S. brinksmanship.
2. Washington won, Moscow lost.
3. The crisis lasted just 13 days.

*There are 2 other misconceptions identified in the online version:

4. It was a high-seas showdown
5. It was an intelligence coup for the CIA

JFK+50 will discuss today the 3rd misconception.

THE CRISIS LASTED JUST 13 DAYS

Mr. Orsi writes:

"Indeed it was 13 days from OCTOBER 16, when Kennedy was 1st told about the missiles, to OCTOBER 28, when the Soviets announced their withdrawal."

But he goes on to explain that the crisis continued on for more than a month.

The Soviets negotiated the details of what weapons would be removed & were dealing with Fidel Castro's demands.

So while the most intense days of the crisis numbered 13, as described in RFK's book "Thirteen Days," there was a "November Extension" as identified by Cuba analyst Peter Kornbluh.